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This Newport conference has covered a large number of issues pertaining to non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), as compared to international 
armed conflicts (LACs). In these concluding remarks, I shall focus on six main 
themes: (i) the proper definition of a NIAC; (ii) the thresholds of armed conflicts; 
(iii) the application of the jus in bello in a NLAC; (iv) the various types of recogni-
tion relevant to a NLAC; (v) intervention by a foreign country in a NlAC; and (vi) 
the interaction between NIACs and lACs. 
1. Definition 
A useful definition of a NLAC in international law appears in Article 1(1) of 
Additional Protocol II (AP II ) of 1977: a NIAC must "take place in the territory 
of a H igh Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed 
forces or other organized armed groups."l (The text goes on to add features that 
do not configure in the nucleus of the general definition; these will be spelled 
out be1ow. )2 
There are two constitutive elements in this definition: 
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(a) A NIAC must take place within the borders of a high contracting party, 
that is to say, a single State; and 
(b) A NIAC has to be waged between the armed forces of the State (loyal to 
the central government) on the one hand, and organized armed groups 
(including dissident armed forces ) on the other. 
A. NIAC as an Internal Armed Conflict 
The first vital ingredient ofNIAC relates to its internal nature, i.e., that it is waged 
within a State. This characteristic is repeated in other texts, as illustrated in Article 
19(1) of the 1954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property, which speaks of "an 
armed conflict not of an international character, occurring within the territory of 
one of the High Contracting Parties."3 Virtually all commonly used definitions of a 
NIAC are restrictive in that the armed conflict is circumscribed to a single State4 
(the common locution in the past was "civil war"). 
Admittedly, a majority of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the 
Hamdan case of 2006, seems to have arrived at the conclusion that the post-911 1 
transnational "war on terrorism" should be deemed a NlAc.s However, the idea 
that a NIAC can be global in nature is oxymoronic: an armed conflict can be a 
NlAC and it can be global, but it cannot be both. Cross-border action against terror-
ists, like the SEAL Team Six raid that took out Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, may be 
carried out as an "extraterritorial law enforcement" operation.6 Ordinary military 
operations in Afghanistan, directed at Al-Qaeda terrorists, blend into an lAC waged 
in that country-against the Taliban-that, in my opinion, is still ongoing.i Re-
peated references have been made in the course of the present conference to the 
American alignment in Afghanistan against "Al-Qaeda and its associates." To my 
mind, the armed conflict in Afghanistan should rather be seen as conducted against 
"the Taliban and their associates." And, since the central issue in the legal (and pub-
lic) debate on the subject is that of detention of captured enemy personnel, I must 
add that I fail to grasp the rationale behind the decision to incarcerate detainees out-
side of Afghanistan. Why is Guantanamo Bay preferable to Bagram? 
B. Organized Armed Groups 
The second component of the definition of NlAC postulates the existence of a dash 
of arms between the armed forces of a State (loyal to the central government) and 
organized armed groups (including dissident armed forces) rebelling against the 
powers that be. Several comments are called for in this context. 
The phrase "organized armed group" is of pivotal significance. The rudiments 
of organization are immanent in any insurgency amounting to a NIAC. Without 
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organization, there is no NIAC (as distinct from mere internal disturbances. )8 The 
organized armed group may fall into two types. It may consist of 0) dissident (viz., 
mutinous) units of the State's armed forces; or it maybe formed by (ii) improvised 
groups of civilians who have coalesced in rebelling against the central government. 
The degree of organization of insurgent groups does not have a fixed pattern. Dis-
sident military forces will naturally possess built-in structure and hierarchy. 
Other-improvised-organized armed groups are likely to be more loosely knit 
together (at least at the onset of the insurgency). But the emphasis is on the exis-
tence of some minimal organization, so that disconnected acts of violence commit-
ted by individuals will be excluded from the definition. 
The insistence on insurgent organized groups being "armed" is principally de-
signed to distinguish them from political opposition factions that challenge the 
central government without resorting to force . For sure, being "armed" does not 
imply that the armament employed by the insurgents has to be sophisticated. 
The central government of the State in which a NLAC is raging is liable to be-
come paralyzed---even to disintegrate and disappear altogether---either as a di-
rect result of the NIAC or fo r other reasons. In extreme cases, such a 
phenomenon produces what is commonly called a "failed State." However, the re-
moval from the scene of the central government does not have to put an end to the 
NIAG Frequently, an existing NIAC maycontinue--or a new NIAC may be trig-
gered-between two or more organized armed groups vying with each other for 
ascendance. Strictly speaking, hostilities between sundry organized armed 
groups-subsequent to the breakdown of governmental control--<an no longer 
be viewed as an insurgency: after all, who is rebelling against whom? But the defini-
tion ofNIAC must embrace such a state of affairs. 
The add -on potential of a clash between two or more organized armed groups 
coming within the scope of a NIAC has been acknowledged by the Appeals Cham-
ber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (lcry) in the 
Tadii case in 1995, which talked about "protracted armed violence between gov-
ernmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a 
State" (emphasis added).9 Article 8(2)(f) of the 1998 Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court follows in the same vein: "armed conflicts that take place in 
the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between govern-
mental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups."IO No 
doubt, this comprehensive version is the correct definition of a NlAC today. 
C. Motives and Modalities 
The motives propelling an organized armed group to an insurgency against the cen-
tral government (or to a violent confrontation with other organized armed groups) 
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may differ. These motives may be political, social, economic, ideological, religious, 
ethnic, etc. Whatever the motive, it does not impact on the definition ofNIAC. 
The modalities ofNIACs are multiple; some are national and some regional : 
(a) An organized armed group may have countrywide goals, the ultimate be-
ing to overthrow the central government, with the insurgents taking into 
their hands the helm of State throughout the territorial domain (the best 
illustration being that of the Franco rebellion in the Spanish Civil War, 
1936-39). A1ternatively, an organized armed group may have more lim-
ited national aims, such as effecting radical constitutional innovations, 
ensuring greater participation of underrepresented groups in the politi-
cal process, securing fundamental freedoms or gaining certain specific 
concessions from the central government. 
(b) The insurgents' aims may be confined to a particular region or locality, 
e.g., demanding autonomy within a portion of the State. The insurgents 
may even push for outright secession of a part of the country, with a view 
to creating a new sovereign State (the best example being that of the 
Southern Confederacy in the American Civil War, 1861-65) or unit-
ing--on irredentist grounds-with an existing foreign State. There may 
be a more complex impetus for the insurgents' drive to wrest control 
over a particular district from the central government. Even criminal in-
centives (as in the case of narco-traffickers) cannot be ruled out. ll 
The long and short of it is that-irrespective of concrete objectives-when an 
organized armed group is rebelling against the central government of a State, there 
is a NlAC in progress. 
11. Thresholds 
The overall spectrwn of violence is wide-ranging from ordinary crime and inter-
nal disturbances to NIACs and lACs-and it is necessary to bear in mind that dif-
ferent tiers of violence are subject to discrete legal regimes. 12 It is therefore useful to 
refer to three thresholds of armed conflicts-two relating to NIACs and one to 
lACs-pius a level of violence that is below the first threshold. 
A. Below-the-Threshold Situations 
Below-the-threshold violence fits a domestic law enforcement paradigm. Article 
1 (2) of AP II provides that the Protocol will not apply to "situations of internal 
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disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and 
other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts."13 The same formula is 
reiterated in Article 8(2)(f) of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court,I4 in Article 22(2) of the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Conven-
tion for the Protection of Cultural Propertyl5 and in a 200 1 Amendment to Arti-
cle 1 of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).16 By now, this 
uniform treaty definition of below- the-threshold violence seems to be universally 
accepted. The two signal adjectives are "isolated and sporadic," and the emblem-
atic noun is "riots." 
Riots, as well as other "isolated and sporadic" disturbances, are ordinarily han-
dled by law enforcement agencies-namely, police forces (regardless of their do-
mestic designation)-rather than by military contingents. Still, the intensity of 
riot-like disturbances may be such that military units are summoned to lend indis-
pensable assistance to the police in stamping out the violence. This by itself does 
not al ter the operation of the law en forcement paradigmY 
Below-the-threshold violence does not call for the application of the jus i" bello 
(the law of armed conflict). The conduct of all concerned in below-the-threshold 
confrontations is governed by the domestic constitutional and criminal legal sys-
tem of the State afflicted with the violence, subject to the strictures of international 
human rights law. 
As a rule, law enforcement agents enjoy less latitude when it comes to opening fire 
on rioters during "isolated and sporadic" disturbances compared to the degree oflat-
itude conferred on the armed forces when engaged in an lAC or even in a NIAC. 
Nevertheless, exceptionally, law enforcement agents-in bclow-the-threshold sce-
narios-may have more latitude in the use of certain weapons, when quelling an or-
dinary disturbance, compared to their counterparts in an armed conflict (either an 
lAC or a NlAC). Preeminently, in Article 1(5) of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Con-
vention contracting parties undertake not to use "riot control agents" (or, in plain 
language, teargas) as a method of warfare, whereas Article U(9)(d) explicitly allows 
the employment of non-lethal chemical agents for law enforcement purposes, in-
cluding domestic riot controL 18 Moreover, the use of expanding soft-nosed b ullets 
(interdicted in armed conflicts)l9 is common when special weapons and tactics 
teams engage in counterterrorism activities, particularly when faced with hostage 
takers or suicide bombers. 
B. Over the First Threshold 
The first threshold of NlACs is established in Common Article 3 to the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 for the protection of war victims, which refers tout court to 
"armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one 
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of the High Contracting Parties."20 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
paved the way fo r Article 19( 1) of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property, which employs the same formula. 21 
Common Article 3 has acquired a special status, since-in the 1986 Nicaragua 
case-the majority of the International Court of Justice held that it expresses 
"minimum rules applicable to international and to non-international conflicts";22 
in other words, that it reflects customary international law (applicable both in LACs 
and in NIACs). Yet, unfortunately, Common Article 3 does not shed light on the 
point at which the first threshold is crossed. Article 19(1) of the Hague Convention 
does not do that either. 
The most authoritative attempt to fill the vacuum was made by the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTY, which held-in the 1995 Tadic case-that there must be 
"protracted armed violence."23 The adjective "protracted" is repeated in Article 
8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.24 
"Protracted" is obviously the antonym of AP II 's "isolated and sporadic," but is 
it enough that the internal violence is prolonged for it to qualify as a NLAC? The 
ICfYTrial Chamber, in its Tadicjudgment ofl997, added-as an extrapolation of 
the notion of "protracted" hostilities-the element of the "intensity" of the armed 
conflict, thereby "distinguishing an armed conflict from banditry, unorganized 
and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities."25 Subsequent judgments of 
the ICfY have come up with "[v]arious indicative factors" in trying to assess the 
intensity of an armed conflict. 26 
C. Over the Second Threshold 
The second threshold is laid down in Article 1 (1) of AP II, which, after stating that a 
NIAC must "take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its 
armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups," goes 
on to refer to organized armed groups that "under responsible command, exercise 
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and 
concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol. "27 
The salient element here, in comparison to the first threshold, is the control ex-
ercised by the insurgent organized armed group (under responsible command) 
over a part of the territory. The size of the area under insurgent control is not de-
fined, but it must besuffident (i) to allow "sustained and concerted military opera-
tions" to be carried out; and (ii) to enable the implementation of the Protocol (for 
example, caring for the wounded and sick). 28 The degree of control exercised by the 
insurgents in the area in question need not exceed these two conditions. In particu-
lar, there is no requirement that "any actual administration in a governmental 
sense" will take place.29 
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As for the first condition, any (military or quasi-military) operations carried out 
by insurgents in a NIAC over the second threshold must be "sustained and con-
certed." "Sustained" means that the operations are kept up continuously; "con-
certed" signals that they are carried out according to some plan.30 
With respect to the second condition, it must be kept in mind that in any 
armed conflict control over certain areas may pass from one side to the other 
(possibly more than once). In the ebb and flow of a NIAC, an insurgent organized 
armed group may lose control over an area earlier seized by it. That by itself is in-
consequential. For the second condition to be met, what is indispensable is that 
the insurgent organized armed group retains control over some terri tory at any 
given time. 
The great advantage of the territorial control prerequisite is that it provides an 
acid test facilitating the ability to tell apart a NIAC from intense violence below the 
threshold. Thus, when one juxtaposes the settings in Libya and Syria in June 201 1, 
it is noteworthy that the rising in Syria is no less protracted or intense than that in 
Libya. If Libya is different from Syria (apart from the element of fore ign interven-
tion with the fiat of the Security Council),)) it is in the fact that the Libyan insur-
gents have gained control oflarge tracts of land, whereas in Syria there has been no 
similar development. The trouble, of course, is that the insistence on insurgents' 
control over territory excludes some cases of protracted and intense violence--e.g., 
the struggles by and against the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland or the 
Basque separatists in Spain.H 
Once the second threshold is crossed, the treaty lawof AP II comes into play for 
contracting parties)) Several provisions of AP II can currently be viewed as declar-
atory of customary international law.J.\ Regardless, it must be perceived that all 
NIACs above the second threshold remain subject also to the customary jus in 
bello, which is applicable whenever the first threshold is crossed. 
D. Over the Third Threshold 
Whereas the gap between the first and the second thresholds is quantitative (the 
second threshold providing weightier evidence that a NlAC is actually occurring), 
the leap over the third threshold is qualitative: it is a move from a NIAC to an lAC. 
Many people are under the impression that a NIAC is ipso facto less intensive than 
an lAC, although this idea is not empirically corroborated by the historical record. 
In any event, it does not matter whether the fighting in an lAC is more or less in-
tense than in a NIAC. The sole question is whether the fighting is intra-State (a 
NlAC) or inter-State (an lAC). The third threshold is crossed automatically once 
two or more States are taking part in the armed conflict, fighting each other. 
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Crossing the third threshold means that the jus in bello in its plenitude will be 
applicable to the anned conflict. The jus in bello applicable in a NlAC is sketchier,3$ 
and the entire gamut of the jus in bello is in play only when an lAC is going on. 
More significantly, perhaps, lACs are subject to a jus ad bellum: international 
law (as entrenched both in the United Nations Charter and in customary interna-
tional law) forbids the use offorce in international relations, with only two excep-
tions, viz., (i) self-defense, and (ii) enforcement action either mandated or 
authorized by a binding decision of the Security Council.36 No parallel jus ad 
bellum exists as regards NIACs. "There is no rule in international law against civil 
wars. "37 While the domestic law of every State forbids an insurgency against the 
established order, international law turns a blind eye to the issue. International 
law neither prohibits an uprising against the central government nor denies the 
right of the central government to put down the insurrection by force. 
Ill. Jus in Bello 
The jus in bello regulating lACs started to develop in the nineteenth century, and 
has now become strongly anchored in both custom and extensive treaty law. Con-
versely, thejus in bello applicable in NlACs did not begin to develop until the adop-
tion of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Indeed, it took several 
decades for the urge to further develop NlAC jus in bello to become firmly im-
planted in the international legal mind-set. 
NIAC jus in bello governs armed conflicts above either the first or the second 
threshold. When it does, it is applicable throughout the territory of the State af-
fected, as long as the NlAC is going on. In the words of the Appeals Chamber of the 
ICfY, in the 2002 case of Kutlarac, a violation of the NlAC jus in bello may "occur 
at a time when and in a place where no fighting is actually taking place.":J8 
A. The Trend of Convergence 
Contemporary developments in treaty law display a palpable trend of growing 
convergence between the jus in bello governing lACs and in NlACs. This trend is 
manifested in the following treaties: 
(a) Article 8(c)-(e) of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, which elaborates a list ofNIAC war crimes (admitted1y not as long 
as the comparable list of lAC war crimes)39 
(b) Article 1(3) of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the CCW, which applies 
the instrument (dealing with mines and booby traps) to NlACs40 
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(c) Article 22( 1) of the 1999 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for 
the Protection of Cultural Property, which does the same-t l 
(d) The 2001 amendment to Article 1 of the CCW, which applies to NlACs 
all the Protocols annexed to the Convention.42 
No doubt, we are also witnessing the emergence of a new customary law in this 
regard: some of it is already fully formed,43 and some is probably in the process of 
formation. 
B. The Impossibility of a Full Merger 
Notwithstanding the increasing resemblance between the norms of the jus in bello 
applicable in LACs and in NlACs, it is unlikely that there will ever be a total merger 
of the law in the two discrete categories of armed conflicts. There have been some 
academic calls for conflating the law regulating the two types of armed conflicts.44 
Yet, at least three insurmountable obstacles stand in the way of such an amalgam-
ation being effected in the practice of States: 
(a) What might be termed a congenital trai t ofNlACs is that captured insur-
gents cannot claim the privileges of prisoners of war (POWS).45 The ra-
tionale is that domestic law always considers insurgents to be criminals, 
perhaps even trai tors.46 When detained by government forces, insur-
gents are subject to prosecution and punishment for their criminal con-
duct by the domestic courts (military or civilian). For that and other 
reasons, insurgents in NlACs cannot be regarded as "combatants" (in 
contradistinction to civilians)Y Accordingly, the 2006 San Remo Man-
ual on Non-In ternational Armed Conflict uses the term "fighters" in-
stead.48 The intrinsic asymmetry between well-organized (trained, disci-
plined, uniformed, etc.) members of the armed forces loyal to the central 
government and loosely organized insurgents (especially when they do 
not belong to dissident forces) creates lots of practical problems in the 
application of the jus in bello in a NIAG 
(b) The law of neutrality does not apply to NlACs.4'1 This is due to the fact 
that in a NIAC solely one single State is embroiled in the armed conflict.50 
The construct of a neutral as a "third State" does not make sense when 
the nature of the armed conflict precludes the possibility of a second 
State being engaged (subject to the extraordinary setting of "recognition 
ofbelligerency").51 
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(c) The whole body oflaw relating to belligerent occupation is out of tune 
with NlACs,S2 since neither areas seized by insurgents nor those retained 
or liberated by the central government can be regarded as occupied terri-
tories in the sense of the jus in bello. $3 
I shall not dwell upon additional-less compelling-problems relating to the le-
gality of certain means and methods of warfare, which have been raised during this 
conference. 
C. Exceptional Situations 
There are two exceptional situations when the jus in bello will apply in NlACs as if 
they were lACs. One-under customary international law-is "recognition of bel-
ligerency."54 The other isconfined to treaty law. Pursuant to Article 1 (4) of Addi-
tional Protocol I of 1977, which is devoted to lACs, armed conflicts in the exercise 
of the right of self-determination are subject to the application of the Protocol and 
the Geneva Conventions, although they do not involve two opposing States.55 It 
must be noted, however, that this is an exceedingly controversial provision which 
does not bind non -contracting parties to the Protocol. 
N . Recognition 
A. "Recognition of Belligerency" 
Sometimes, the central government of a State ravaged by a NlAC is compelled by 
circumstances to face a dire reali ty. This happens primarily when, by dint of their 
military successes in the field, the insurgents manage to capture large numbers of 
soldiers serving in the armed fo rces loyal to the central government. If the central 
government desires to ensure that its captive soldiers will benefit from POW privi-
leges, it has no viable option except to confer on the insurgents "recognition of bel-
ligerency," which means that--on condition of reciprocity-the whole jus in bello 
governing lACs will become applicable to the NlAC.56 
It is interesting to note that, in a regular lAC, a belligerent party is not required 
to grant POW status to its own nationals: an enemy soldier (serving in the armed 
forces of State B) owing allegiance to the captor State (State A)-mostly as a result 
of the link of nationality-is not regarded by the jus in bello as a lawful combatant 
entitled to POW statusY In a NIAC, members of the organized armed group fight-
ing against the central government of State A are ordinarily nationals of that State. 
Once the central government proclaims a "recognition of belligerency," however, 
it is bound to treat insurgent captives as POWs despite their local nationality. What 
ensues is that the protection afforded to such insurgents in a NIAC-by virtue of 
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the jus in bello-is actually wider in scope than the parallel protection available in 
an lAC58 
When "'recognition of belligerency" is granted by the central government of 
State A, it means that the lACjus in bello is applied to the NlAC not only in the rela-
tions between that government and the insurgents but also vis-a.-vis all other 
States. The upshot is that the laws of neutrality will be in effect as far as States B, C, 
etc., are concerned. These States will then not be allowed to forcibly intervene in 
the armed conflict: neither in support of the insurgents nor even in support of the 
central government, notwithstanding the general rule under customary interna-
tional law that intervention to assist the central government is permitted.59 
"Recognition of belligerency" may be proclaimed not only by the central gov-
ernment of State A but by State B. Such recognition cannot affect the conduct of 
hostilities between the central government of State A and the insurgents (these 
hostilities will continue to be governed by the NIACjus in bello). Nor does "recog-
nition of belligerency" by State B affect the position of States C, D, etc. But "recog-
nition of belligerency" by State B will alter its standing with respect to the NlAC 
The legal effect of "recognition of belligerency" by State B does not denote that 
that State is thereby entitled to forcibly intervene in the conflict in favor of the 
insurgents. To the contrary, State B is bound by its " recognition of belliger-
ency" to observe total neutrality in the NlAC That is to say, following "recognition 
of belligerency," State B will have to display impartiality toward both the central 
government of State A and the insurgents. Whereas-prior to "recognition of bel-
ligerency"-State B was allowed to forcibly intervene in the NlAC in favo r of the 
central government of State NXi and disallowed to do that in aiding and abetting the 
insurgents,61 as from the turning point of "recognition of belligerencY' State B is 
forbidden to assist any ofthe opposing sides. State B thus loses its pre-existing right 
to militarily assist the central government of State A, without acquiring a new right 
to militarily support the insurgents. 
As a matter offact, explicit "recognition of belligerency" is largely in "disuse" 
today.62 But the basic concept of "recognition of belligerency" is as relevant as ever. 
There is no need for an express proclamation of "recognition of belligerency," in-
asmuch as it may be distilled from the actual conduct or official pronouncements 
of State B. Thus, "recognition of belligerencY' may be tacitly inferred from a pro-
mulgation of neutrality issued by State B63 (so that instead of such neutrality flow-
ing from "recognition of belligerency," it is the other way around). 
"Recognition of belligerency" may also be implied from the conduct of the cen-
tral government of State A-for example, if it confers on insurgent captives the sta-
tus ofPOWs (a dear-cut indication that the lAC jus in bello applies). Additionally, 
if the central government of State A wishes to dose a mari time port seized and 
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controlled by the insurgents, the only effective way to do this may be to impose a 
blockade.64 The upside, from the central government's viewpoint, is that it can 
then interfere with freedom of navigation of international shipping on the high 
seas. The downside is that the imposition of a blockade on a port controlled by the 
insurgents implies "recognition of belligerency," inasmuch as a blockade is a 
means of warfare vouchsafed by lAC jus i" bello-subject to certain conditions 
(preeminently, that the blockade is effective and does not exist on paper only)6S_ 
but not by NIAC jus i" bello. If the central government of State A does not wish to 
bestow upon the insurgents (by implication) "recognition of belligerency," it has 
no choice but to avoid a proclamation of blockade as against a port controlled by 
them.66 
B. Other Types of Recognition 
"Recognition of belligerency" must not be confused with three other types of rec-
ognition: (i) "recognition of insurgency," (ii) recognition of a new government 
and (iii) recognition of a new State. 
"Recognition of insurgency" in State A is issued by State B and has conse-
quences that are less far -reaching than those attendant on "recognition ofbelliger-
ency." "Recognition of insurgency" will usually come about when an organized 
armed group fighting the central government of State A gains effective control of 
some territory. By granting (explicitly or implicitly) "recognition of insurgency," 
State B merely indicates that it will maintain some de facto relations with the insur-
gents, in order to safeguard its own interests (and those of its nationals) in the terri-
tory actually under the sway of the insurgents.67 In other words, State B will 
outflank the central government and deal directly with the insurgents in matters 
pertaining to the area subject to their control. 
Recognition of the insurgents as the new central government of State A may be 
granted by State B "prior to, in the absence of, concurrently with, or subsequent to 
recognition of belligerency" by the central government of State A (or by State C) .68 
The outcome of a recognition of the insurgents by State B as the new central gov-
ernment of State A is a dramatic volte-face in the political constellation. It means 
that, following the recognition, State B may extend military assistance to the new 
government (byconsentlrequest) against the forces still loyal to the ancien regime, 
now looked upon as the insurgents against the reconstructed central authorities. I 
shall have more to say on this eventuality in the context of intervention. 69 It must 
be noted, however, that premature recognition of the new government is a breach 
of internationallaw.7o 
Another possibility is recognition-issued by State B--ofthe entity created by 
the insurgents as a new State, X. What such recognition denotes is that State B 
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regards the armed conflict not asan intra-State NLAC (between the central govern-
ment and organized armed groups) but as an inter-State lAC (between States A 
and X). This is an even more radical reshuffle of the political cards. Still. in practice. 
the result of recognition of State X is similar to "recognition ofbe11igerency" in that 
State B must then maintain neutrality regarding both belligerent parties. 
v. Intervention 
A. Forcible Intervention against the Cen tral Government 
State B is liable to forcibly intervene in the affairs of State A by fomenting an insur-
gency against the central government of State A. If State B has effective control over 
the insurgents. they may be regarded as its de facto organs.7] There is no need to go 
here into the controversial issue of the degree of control required in order for it to 
be effective for this purpose. Suffice it to say that. if State B's control over the 
insurgents is effective. the armed conflict is intemationalized.n In other words. what 
appears on the face of it to be a NIAC in State A would actually cross the third 
threshold and qualify as an lAC between States A and B. 
Generally speaking. the issue offorcible intervention by State B in State A relates 
to a less flagrant scenario. The presupposition is that a genuine NIAC is taking 
place in State A, but State B extends military assistance to the insurgents against the 
central government of State A. Such military assistance may cross the third thresh-
old and bring about an LAC between State A and B (side by side with the NIAC) . 
However, State B has some elbow room before its action is considered to be cross-
ing the third threshold. Thus, the majority of the International Court of J ustice-
in the Nicaragua case of 1986---did "not believe" that mere "assistance to rebels in 
the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support" rates as an 
armed attack.n Still, the degree of logistical support that can lawfully be extended 
by State B to insurgents in State A is not free of doubt.74 At any rate, it is indisput-
able that-at a certain point-a forcible intervention by State B on behalf of the in-
surgents against the central government of State A will produce an LAC. 
B. Forcible Intervention in Support of the Central Government 
Under customary international law, State B is allowed to forcibly intervene in a 
NLAC in State A, as long as this is done on behalf of the central government-at its 
request or, as a minimum, with its consent-and against the insurgents. It is true 
that, under Article 2 of a 1975 resolution of the Institut de Droit International, 
"The Principle of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars," it is forb idden to extend for-
eign assistance to any party in a "civil war."7$ But this prohibition is irreconcilable 
with traditional international law;76 it runs counter to the statement of the 
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International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case that intelVention is "allowable 
at the request of the government of aState";77 and it is equally inconsistent with the 
more modern practice of States.78 Contemporary international practice is replete 
with instances of detachments of armed forces sent by one State to another, at the 
latter's request, in order to help in restoring law and order in the face of intractable 
domestic turmoil.79 
If State B forcibly intelVenes on behalf of the central government of State A 
against the insurgents, the armed conflict still qualifies as a NIAC---even when 
State B deploys in State A an expeditionary force engaged in intense hostilities 
against the insurgents-inasmuch as the troops of State B are not battling another 
State, but operating jointly with that other State (State A) to quell the insurgency. 
The legal position remains the same notwithstanding effective control by the in-
surgents of large areas and despite large-scale casualties that the hostilities entail. 
Surely, State B cannot dispatch troops into State A-in order to fight the insur-
gents within the latter's territory-against the will of the host government. Any 
forcible intelVention by State B in a NIAC going on within State A must take place 
with the full consent of the central government of State A.so Such consent may be in 
the form of either (i) an ad hoc request for (or acceptance of) help after the NIAC 
has started; or (ii) a previous treaty (usually a military alliance or a regional ar-
rangement) in which contracting parties confer on each other the right of interven-
tion in prospective NIACs. (For an example, see the 2002 Durban Protocol of the 
African Union.)81 
When consent is granted by State A to entry into its territory of armed forces of 
State B, in order to carry out military operations against the insurgents, it must be 
appreciated that-in the language of the International Court of lust ice, in its 2005 
judgment in the Armed Activities (Congo v. Uganda) case-$tate B is restricted by 
" the parameters of that consent, in terms of geographic location and objectives. "82 
Moreover, as stressed by the Court, State A's consent can always be revoked (no 
formalities being required for revocation, in the absence of a treaty).83 Thisisacru-
cial point. By revoking its consent, State A pulls the rug from under the legality of 
the presence of the foreign troops and State B must extract them without undue 
delay. 
Any extension of the presence of the armed forces of State B in the territory of 
State A, beyond the termination of State A's consent to their presence (plus a rea-
sonable space of time enabling their orderly departure), amounts to aggression,84 
and converts the armed conflict from a NIAC into an lAC between States A and B. 
Naturally, there is a problem if the central government of State A disappears 
(State A thus becoming a "failed State"). In such circumstances, no party to the 
NIAC can express its consent to foreign intelVention in the NIAC, and no 
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revocation of consent can be issued. This scenario might invite application of the 
lnstitut's 1975 resolution concerning non -intervention in "civil wars."85 The rea-
son is that, should States Band C both intervene militarily in a NIAC in the "failed 
State" (A)-in support of two opposing organized armed groups86-they are likely 
to dash with each other, with an lAC between States Band C as the outcome. 
C. Recognition of the Insurgen ts as the New Governmen t 
Recognition by State B of the leadership of an insurgency as the new central gov-
ernment of State A transforms everything:87 the newly recognized central govern-
ment is the one empowered to seek forcible assistance from State B; it is also the 
one competent to revoke the request for help. Such recognition was extended to 
the Benghazi authorities by a number of European countries intervening in the 
Libyan NlAC against the T ripoli government run by Moammar Qaddafi. 
Evidently, if State B recognizes the leadership of an organized armed group of 
insurgents as the new central government of State A, and State C continues to rec-
ognize the original central government or recognizes the leadership of another or-
ganized armed group as the successor of that government, and ifboth States Band 
C militarily intervene in the NlAC in State A, this is likely to develop into an lAC 
between States B and c.88 
The Security Council can always adopt a binding decision (under Chapter VII of 
the United Nations Charter), which will mandate or authorize forcible interven-
tion by other States in a NIAC in progress in State A.89 Such intervention will cer-
tainly be lawful, but (if directed against the central government of State A) it will 
either turn the NIAC into an lAC or bring about a separate lAG 
VI Interaction 
A. Armed Conflict and Criminal Activities 
The outbreak of an armed conflict (whether an lAC or a NIAC) does not entail the 
cessation of ordinary criminal activities (within the ordinary bounds of the law en-
forcement paradigm). Indeed, the outbreak of an armed conflict may mean that 
ordinary crime is on the rise: this is commonly due to (i) psychological reasons 
linked to times of great tension; (ii) the omnipresence of weapons during an armed 
conflict; and even (iii ) the emergence of n umerous new crimes (such as black 
marketeering or trading with the enemy). In any event, ordinary crimes--even 
when committed in the course of an armed conflict-are governed not by the jus itl 
bello but by the domestic criminal law, subject to the precepts of international hu-
man rights. 
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As noted earlier , a NIAC may have criminal motivations.90 In such cases, it is pa-
tently difficult to draw the line between military operations executed against the 
insurgents in a NIAC and those directed at ordinary criminals. Colombia is a prime 
example. We heard at this conference that the Colombian armed forces are pro-
vided with multicolored cards telling them whether their operations come within 
the rubric of a NIAC or the law enforcement paradigm (below the threshold).91 
The idea is attractive, but I doubt its efficacy. After all, the two categories of situa-
tions are governed by different legal systems, and the training of forces required is 
by no means the same. The flip of a card may not be sufficient for the government 
units to adapt themselves instantly to an entirely disparate legal regime. 
B. Simultaneous NlACs 
More than one NlAC may be going on in a single country at any given time. This 
transpires when the central government has to contend-usually in distinct parts 
of a large territory-with assorted organized armed groups having diverse, and 
perhaps even clashing, aims. (As we heard at this conferen ce, the Philippines 
presents a vivid illustration.)92 
A NlAC in one country (State A) may spill over its borders and generate another 
NIAC within a neighboring country (State B). The situation in the Great Lakes re-
gion in Africa (in different time frames) is the most graphic example. In this sce-
nario, insurgents against the central government of State A find temporary shelter 
within State 8 and ignite another NIAC, this time against the central government 
of State B. As long as the two central governments of States A and 8 (acting sepa-
rately or in collaboration with each other) wage hostilities only against the insur-
gents, the two simultaneous conflicts--despite their cross-border effects-remain 
NIACs. But if the two central governments become embroiled in combat against 
each other, the armed conflict crosses the third threshold and becomes an lAC. 
There is actually a parallel state of affairs in lACs. Two or more lACs between di-
verse belligerent parties may be going on simultaneously (perhaps in different 
parts of the world). These separate lACs may spread and even roll into one. Thus, 
the USSR was part ofthe Grand Alliance against Nazi Germany from June 194 1 on, 
but it joined the war against Japan only in August 1945. 
C. Combinations ofNIACs and lACs 
There may be multiple combinations ofNlACs and lACs, both vertically (along an 
axis of time) and horizontally (along an axis of space). 
Horizontally, the territory of a single State maybe ravaged by hostilities that can 
be categorized as both an lAC (between two or more States opposing one another) 
and a NIAC (between the central government and an organized armed group or 
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even between two or more rival organized armed groups vying for power within 
the State). The dual armed conflicts, international and internal, may commence si-
multaneously or consecutively (the lAC may be preceded by the NlAC or vice 
versa). But the point is that-whether synchronized or unsynchronized-the hos-
tilities have separate inter-State and intra-State strands.93 That is what happened, 
for instance, in Afghanistan in October 2001: the Taliban regime, having fought a 
long-standing NlAC with the Northern Alliance, got itself embroiled in a parallel 
lAC with the United States and its allies as a result of providing shelter and support 
to the Al-Qaeda terrorists who had launched the notorious attack against the 
United States on 9/1 1.94 
Vertically, armed conflicts may be mixed in two ways. First, an armed conflict 
may commence as a NIAC but later segue into--or bring about-an lAC. We have 
already seen how a forcib le intervention by State B on the side of insurgents against 
the central government of State A will trigger an lAC. 95 It should be added that 
if the central government of State A disappears-and if the insurgents asswne con-
trol over State A, forming a new central government therein--continuation of the 
hostilities by State B against the erstwhile insurgents would convert the armed con-
flict from a NIAC into an lAC, since the armed forces of State B will now be pitted 
against the new central government of State A. 
An alternative vertical scenario arises when an lAC is the outcome of the implo-
sion of a State torn apart bya NlAC and the continuation of the hostilities between 
the several new sovereign States into which it has fragmented. Such implosion and 
fragmentation occurred in Yugoslavia in the 19905. In 1997, the Trial Chamber of 
the IefY held in the Tadi{ case that, from the beginning of 1992 until May of the 
same year, an lAC existed in Bosnia between the forces of the Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina on the one hand, and those of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro), on the other. % Yet, the majority of the Chamber (Judges 
Stephen and Vohrah) arrived at the conclusion that, as a result of the withdrawal of 
Yugoslav troops announced in May 1992, the conflict reverted to being a NlAC in 
nature.97 The Presiding Judge (McDonald ) dissented on the ground that the with-
drawal was a fiction and that Yugoslavia remained in effective control of the Serb 
forces in Bosnia.98 The majority opinion was reversed by the lCfY Appeals Cham-
ber in 1999.99 The original Trial Chamber's majority opinion had elicited much 
criticism from scholars;HIO and even before the delivel)' of the final judgment on 
appeal, another Trial Chamber of the ICfY took a divergent view in the DeJali, case 
of 1998. 101 Still, the essence of the disagreement must be viewed as factual in na-
ture. Legally speaking, the fundamental character of an armed confli ct as an lAC or 
a NlAC can indeed metamorphose-more than once-from one stretch of time to 
another. 
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Obviously, as far as fighters in the field are concerned, it may not always be easy 
to detect at what exact time frame a NlAC has morphed into an lAC: if the ICrY 
judges-with the advantages of legal expertise and hindsight---could not readily 
agree on an analysis of the situation in Bosnia in 1992, one can only imagine how 
much more confusing the position looked from the battlefield perspective. It is 
therefore easier to wrestle with the situation when a dear-cut interval can be de-
tected between the NIAC and the lAC. The template is Eritrea. This country de-
clared its fonnal independence from Ethiopia-following a protracted NlAC and a 
referendum- in 1993 . Then, after a period of several years, border disputes be-
tween Eritrea and Ethiopia triggered a full-scale lAC in 1998-2000 and reignited 
furthe r hostilities in 2003. The dividing line here between the NIAC and the lAC 
(unlike in the former Yugoslav provinces) is easy to delineate. 
Just as a NIAC may turn into an lAC, an lAC may turn into a NIAC. Iraq is a 
good illustration . After the fall of Baghdad in an lAC between the American-led co-
alition and the Baathist regime, a newly elected government was installed, at which 
point a NlAC evolved between it and the remnants of the Baatbists. The NlAC in 
Iraq was waged concurrently with the coalition's lAC pursued against the same 
foe Jo2 The lAC came to an end after fierce fighting upon the official termination of 
American combat operations in Iraq in 2010, but the NlAC does not appear to be 
over yet. 
VII. Conclusions 
There is no need to belabor the point that NIACs are taking place all over the world 
with startling frequency and with alarming intensity. NlACs are certainly more 
common today than lACs, and the trail of devastation that they leave behind is 
sometimes colossal. Winning domestic peace subsequent to a sanguinary NIAC 
may take decades. 
These self-evident truths are not always registered in the official gazettes. The 
reason is that governments are often "in denial," doing their utmost to ratchet 
down the applicable threshold of violence. That is to say, when governments are 
engaged in an lAC, they tend togo one step below, claiming that the armed confli ct 
is under the third threshold. When they are caught in a NlAC, they are reluctant to 
concede that they are facing an insurgency and are inclined to ding to the fiction 
that the violence (however protracted and intense) is sporadic and constitutes 
merely a disturbance below the first threshold. 10) Still, it is the duty of international 
lawyers to make the right call when lACs or NIACs are taking place, without mak-
ing concessions to "political correctness" in the eyes of this or that government. We 
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must constantly bear in mind that correct taxonomy lays the foundation for the ap-
plication of the right legal regime. 
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